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Single-unit recordings conducted during perceptual decision-making tasks have yielded
tremendous insights into the neural coding of sensory stimuli. In such experiments, detec-
tion or discrimination behavior (the psychometric data) is observed in parallel with spike
trains in sensory neurons (the neurometric data). Frequently, candidate neural codes for
information read-out are pitted against each other by transforming the neurometric data in
some way and asking which code’s performance most closely approximates the psycho-
metric performance.The code that matches the psychometric performance best is retained
as a viable candidate and the others are rejected. In following this strategy, psychometric
data is often considered to provide an unbiased measure of perceptual sensitivity. It is
rarely acknowledged that psychometric data result from a complex interplay of sensory
and non-sensory processes and that neglect of these processes may result in misestimat-
ing psychophysical sensitivity. This again may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the
adequacy of candidate neural codes. In this review, we ﬁrst discuss requirements on the
neural data for a subsequent neurometric-psychometric comparison. We then focus on
different psychophysical tasks for the assessment of detection and discrimination perfor-
mance and the cognitive processes that may underlie their execution. We discuss further
factors that may compromise psychometric performance and how they can be detected or
avoided.We believe that these considerations point to shortcomings in our understanding
of the processes underlying perceptual decisions, and therefore offer potential for future
research.
Keywords: psychophysics, perception, signal detection theory, psychometric, neurometric, receiver operating
characteristic, psychophysical task, single-unit electrophysiology
INTRODUCTION
Gustav Theodor Fechner is best known as the founding father
of psychophysics. It is perhaps less well known that Fechner
distinguished between what he called “outer psychophysics”, the
relationship between physical stimuli and sensation, and “inner
psychophysics”, the relationship between (neuro-) physiological
activity and sensation. While being successful at making outer
psychophysics the cornerstone of the evolving science of psychol-
ogy, physiological methods at his time were not developed enough
to allow direct investigation of inner psychophysics, and Fechner
was well aware of this limitation (Fechner, 1860; Baird and Noma,
1978).
This situation has changed dramatically in the meantime,
mainly with the advent of the awake behaving monkey prepara-
tion (Evarts, 1966), which allows for the simultaneous assessment
of psychophysical measurements (psychometric data, e.g., percent
correct responses) and spikes from(mostly cortical) single neurons
in sensory areas of the brain (neurometric data; e.g., Newsome
et al., 1989; Mountcastle et al., 1990; Vogels and Orban, 1990).
These seminal studies, as well as a multitude of studies published
since then, have centered around neurometric–psychometric (NP)
comparisons in the sense that some measure of performance qual-
ity (such as a detection threshold or a difference limen) is extracted
from the neuro- and the psychometric data for direct compari-
son on the same scale (reviewed in Parker and Newsome, 1998).
In concert with the application of signal detection theory (SDT,
Green and Swets, 1966) to neurometric data, these studies have
provided striking evidence that the stimulus detection and dis-
crimination capacity of single sensory neurons can be close to
or even exceed the capacity of the entire organism. These ﬁnd-
ings are in agreement with Barlow’s (1961) notion of redundancy
reduction: Barlow postulated that the neuronal representation of
stimulus information (i.e., the representation relevant for Fech-
ner’s inner psychophysics) must be efﬁcient (Barlow, 1961, 1972);
in other words, as few spikes as possible in as few neurons as pos-
sible should be used to encode a sensory stimulus, a tenet quite
different to Sherrington’s (1940) idea of the brain as“amillion-fold
democracy”, in which each citizen (neuron) counts for little.
The NP comparison has realized Fechner’s dream of “inner
psychophysics” – relating neurophysiological activity to sensation.
However, the precise nature of this relationship is still far from
clear. There are a variety of unresolved questions, among them:
(1) What is the role of single neurons in the representation of
information? This question is closely related to the discrim-
inability of a given set of stimuli by single neurons’ responses.
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Whether a neuron’s discriminability is to be considered high
or low can be most meaningfully assessed if viewed relative to
psychophysical performance (Stüttgen, 2010). High discrim-
inability of single neurons is a prerequisite for sparse coding;
thus, it can constrain theories on how information is repre-
sented in a given brain area (such as response pooling or the
lower envelope principle; Parker and Newsome, 1998). This,
in turn, relates closely to Barlow’s (1972) notions about the
efﬁciency of neuronal representations.
(2) What neural code is used for stimulus representation? NP
comparisons can be used to compare psychometric to neuro-
metric performance based on different candidate codes. For
instance, it has been found that two candidate codes,ﬁring rate
and ﬁring periodicity, both carry ample information about
vibrotactile stimuli (Hernandez et al., 2000; Arabzadeh et al.,
2006). The code with a neurometric performance that best
matches the performance of the observers is then typically
assumed to be the one that is used by the brain (e.g. Salinas
et al., 2000; Luna et al., 2005). More systematic approaches
try to assess “complete” neuronal populations (see below)
and pit candidate codes against each other. Whenever some
code’s performance, computed in a statistically optimal fash-
ion, falls short of the subjects’psychometric performance, that
neuronal code can be rejected (Jacobs et al., 2009).
(3) How is sensory information exploited for perceptual decision-
making? Aside from the question of sensory processing, per-
ceptual decision-making encompasses the problem of how
sensory information is put to use for adaptive action (Gold
and Shadlen, 2001, 2007). For example, monkeys do not
make use of all stimulus information available to them, but
rather commit to actionprior to stimulus termination, thereby
ignoring useful information (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; see
also Resulaj et al., 2009). Also, psychophysical performance is
frequently not solely determined by sensory processes but by
a range of biasing factors, among them recent stimulus and
reward history (Boneau et al., 1965; Busse et al., 2011).
Importantly, the validity of claims about coding schemes on the
single-neuron and population level hinges crucially on the precise
assessment of the sensory limits of the observer, i.e., psychophysi-
cal sensitivity. While great effort has been devoted to the study of
neural coding at both the level of individual neurons and neural
populations (e.g., Bialek et al., 1991; Shadlen et al., 1996; de Ruyter
van Steveninck et al., 1997; Riehle et al., 1997; Gold and Shadlen,
2007; Jacobs et al., 2009), we believe that research aimed at the
understanding of the cognitive processes underlying performance
in a given psychophysical task has been comparatively neglected
by the community. As we will argue below, this could have led to a
systematic underestimationof psychophysical sensitivity of animal
subjects and, consequently, to an overestimation of neurometric
relative to psychometric sensitivity.
In the remainder of the article, we will ﬁrst review problems in
acquiring neurometric data suitable for NP comparisons, a prime
focus of research in the last 20 years. Then, turning toward the
problem of measuring the psychometric function, we will intro-
duce signal detection theoretical “process models”, i.e., models of
the sequence of cognitive steps underlying performance in these
tasks. We will discuss additional factors affecting psychophysi-
cal performance not accounted for by such process models. We
argue that, in order to gain further insight into the physiology of
perception, the entire cascade of cognitive processes underlying
perceptual decision-making tasks has to be explored.
ESTIMATING NEUROMETRIC SENSITIVITY
Conducting an NP comparison poses two distinct problems: the
assessment of neurometric sensitivity and the assessment of psy-
chometric sensitivity. In this section, we will ﬁrst brieﬂy intro-
duce what is meant by an NP comparison. Then, we will discuss
problems that arise when attempting to determine psychometric
sensitivity.
Figure 1 illustrates a simple NP comparison for a yes/no detec-
tion task. Several stimuli whose intensities are distributed around
the presumed absolute threshold of detectability are presented
FIGURE 1 | Example illustration of a neurometric–psychometric
comparison. (A) A typical psychometric curve from a yes/no detection
experiment with six stimuli of varying intensity (see Box 1). Smooth line
indicates ﬁt of a cumulative Gaussian to the data points. Dotted line
indicates the stimulus value at which the psychometric curve reaches 50%
of its ﬁnal height. This value is commonly taken as the psychophysical
threshold. (B) Some typical neurometric curves: a single neuron’s spikes
were counted during stimulus presentation. The neuron was assumed to
“detect” the event when it ﬁred in excess of n spikes during stimulus
presentation, where n here encompasses 1, 2, 4, and 8 spikes. The
neurometric curve for n =2 matches the psychometric curve best, as
assessed by their common threshold of 175 (arbitrary units). Thus, the NP
ratio here is 175/175=1.
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many times to an observer, whose task is to respond “yes” if he
perceives the stimulus and “no” otherwise. As stimulus inten-
sity increases, the proportion of “yes” responses increases as well.
The pattern of responses can be ﬁtted by a sigmoidal function.
The resulting psychophysical curve is characterized by at least
two parameters, the threshold (the point on the abscissa corre-
sponding to 50% detection performance) and the slope of the
curve. The term “psychophysical sensitivity” refers to the recip-
rocal of threshold; thus, the lower the threshold, the higher the
sensitivity.
Imagine that, while the observer was performing the task, a
sensory neuron of his is recorded, and its spike responses dur-
ing stimulus presentation are counted. Neurometric curves can
be constructed in a simple way by determining the proportion of
stimulus presentation trials on which the neuron ﬁred more than
n spikes (i.e., the neuron is deemed to detect the event when more
than n spikes are ﬁred during stimulus presentation). Figure 1B
displays the results of this exercise for n comprising 1, 2, 4, and 8
spikes. It is readily visible that the curve constructed with a crite-
rion of n = 2 resembles the psychometric curve best in terms of
both threshold and slope. In fact, psychometric and neurometric
threshold (for n = 2) are identical in this example, and theNP ratio
therefore equals 1. Of course, there are considerably more ways
to construct neurometric curves, perhaps most notably receiver-
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis (Vogels and Orban, 1990;
Britten et al., 1992), which compares distributions of spike counts
for pairs of stimuli and returns the maximum classiﬁcation per-
formance. There exists a variety of population coding schemes
beyond simple spike counts, involving spike timing, spike cor-
relations within (Jacobs et al., 2009), and between spike trains
of different neurons (Zohary et al., 1994; Shadlen et al., 1996;
Schneidman et al., 2006; Shlens et al., 2006, 2009; Ohiorhenuan
et al., 2010).
Obviously, NP comparisons require two different kinds of
measurement – estimating psychometric and neurometric sen-
sitivity. We will have more to say about psychometric sensitivity
below. For now, we focus on two important preconditions for
the assessment of neurometric sensitivity: causality and complete-
ness. Naturally, in order to make meaningful NP comparisons,
the sensory neurons under investigation must be involved in the
psychophysical task at hand, i.e., neural activity of these neurons
must be causally related to psychophysical performance. The neu-
rometric signals entering the NP comparison should be necessary
and, ideally, also sufﬁcient to explain the sensory-driven aspects
of the behavior. This requires to record from an “informational
bottleneck”, i.e., a neural structure through which all relevant
signals pass and which does not receive feedback signals from
downstream structures. This way, a clear identiﬁcation of cause
and effect is possible. Unfortunately, such informational bottle-
necks are rarely to be found, one notable exception being retinal
ganglion cells (Jacobs et al., 2009). In the central nervous sys-
tem, the direction of signal ﬂow in ascending sensory pathways is
ambiguous. With very few exceptions, subsequent levels of pro-
cessing are interconnected in a bidirectional way. Also, circular
connectivity often bypasses stations on the ascending pathways
(e.g., cortical feedback of brain stem centers bypassing thalamic
stations; Furuta et al., 2010). These problems exacerbate in the
neocortex where neurons are intricately interconnected – to their
neighbors as well as to a multitude of distant neurons residing
in other areas. Thus, a close look at the detailed connectivity
of sensory systems blurs the notion of an “ascending pathway.”
Instead, sensory systems seem to be described better as com-
plex networks, which receive signals at one point and output
signals at another with reverberating signal ﬂow in-between.
In conclusion, informational bottlenecks, furnishing complete-
ness, and causality, are difﬁcult to deﬁne in the central ner-
vous system. Alternatively, a causal contribution of a neuronal
structure can be demonstrated by showing that the behavior is
blocked/evoked by lesions/electrical stimulation of the structure
in question (Parker and Newsome, 1998). A cautionary note is
in order, however, as psychophysical performance can readily be
impaired by blocking structures located downstream from the
ones actually performing the critical (sensory) computation; in
this case, performance degradation may be due to, e.g., response
confusion rather than abolition of the sensory function proper.
Furthermore, abolishment of a function may result from disrupt-
ing non-speciﬁc modulatory structures with no contribution to
encode or compute the concrete signals under observation. Also,
parallel processing of sensory information along a different sen-
sory pathway cannot be ruled out by this strategy; in the latter case,
psychometric performance would depend on two or more struc-
tures, and the relation between neurons and sensation cannot be
pinned down since the relative importance of the structures is not
known.
Yet another strategy is to artiﬁcially “create” informational bot-
tlenecks by presenting point-like stimuli in both space and time
(Hecht et al., 1942; Barlow, 1961; Sakitt, 1972; Johansson and
Vallbo, 1979; Vallbo et al., 1984). Point-like stimuli are attrac-
tive for studies of the physiology of perception as they reduce the
number of neurons engaged in the task and the time window in
which neuronal responses need to be monitored to a well speciﬁed
minimum. Sakitt (1972), for instance, carried this strategy to the
extreme as she studied the difference in visual detection perfor-
mance evoked by just one photon more. One photon will interact
just with one molecule of rhodopsin located in just one photore-
ceptor. This approach therefore ingeniously related the concept of
informational bottleneck to just one cell in the layer of photorecep-
tors. Using sophisticated psychophysical techniques in humans,
Sakitt successfully related a stimulus of “one more photon” to a
difference in the subject’s performance, and was thus able to con-
clude that the action of a single photoreceptor has a signiﬁcant
contribution to perception. A related concept is the attempt to
electrically stimulate a single neuron, which has been ﬁrst realized
using electrical stimulation of individual primary afferent ﬁbers
in humans (Ochoa and Torebjork, 1983;Vallbo et al., 1984). These
authors found that subjects perceived the activation of individual
tactile nerve ﬁbers in three out of the four classes of ﬁber types
investigated. Some rapidly adapting ﬁbers seem to give rise to a
perceptual change with a difference of just one evoked spike. More
recently, the technical advent of juxtacellular stimulation made
this approach available for the study of the central nervous sys-
tem (Houweling and Brecht, 2008; Voigt et al., 2008). Injecting
just about 15 spikes in one neuron in primary somatosensory cor-
tex evoked a measurable difference in detection performance of
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a rat showing that even single cortical neurons can have an effect
on perception. This method bears great promise to be used for
systematic mapping of behavioral effects in different stations of a
sensory pathway.
Unfortunately, single neuron responses (and thus artiﬁcial
bottlenecks) cannot be realistically obtained with natural sen-
sory stimuli evolving in space and time, at least in mammalian
brains. Even limiting the stimulus in space and time and applying
near-threshold intensities, not one but many neurons in primary
sensory cortices will get activated (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005;
Stüttgen and Schwarz, 2008, 2010). Thus, neither the assessment
of a complete informational bottleneck (aside of retinal ganglion
cells), nor the creation of an artiﬁcial one constituted by a single
cell seems attainable. One study in the whisker-related primary
somatosensory (barrel) cortex of rats has provided a quantitative
hint on the number of neurons engaged vs. the number of neu-
rons needed to match the perceptual performance. Using transient
single-whisker deﬂections at psychophysical threshold, around a
thirdof the stimulations at psychophysical threshold intensitywere
responded by neurons in the principal barrel cortical column of
the stimulated whisker (Stüttgen and Schwarz, 2008). Thus, alone
in the barrel column receiving strongest input of the stimulated
whisker (the principal barrel column) around 3000 neurons are
active with minimal stimulation. The number of all cells engaged
in primary somatosensory cortex is surely far higher because cells
in adjacent barrel columns respond as well to single whisker stim-
uli. On the other hand, the same study found that ﬁve of the most
sensitive neurons carry sufﬁcient information to explain the psy-
chometric performance. In case the read-out mechanism is less
selective, around 16 barrel cortex neurons might be sufﬁcient. In
fact, this discrepancy of thousands of cells engaged by the stimulus
vs. a few needed to do the job has become a common theme in
all studies trying to compare the performance of single neurons to
the one of the subject. Since the pioneering studies of Newsome,
Movshon, and coworkers in the late 1980s, the single neuron neu-
rometric performance has been found with few exceptions to be
close and somewhat lower compared to that of the observer (Tol-
hurst et al., 1983; Newsome et al., 1989; Britten et al., 1992; Geisler
andAlbrecht,1997;Uka andDeAngelis, 2003;Purushothamanand
Bradley, 2005; Stüttgen and Schwarz, 2008; Cohen and Newsome,
2009).
An outlier result were the ﬁndings of the pioneering studies
(Britten et al., 1992; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994), as neuro-
metric sensitivity was judged up to 10 times higher than the
psychometric one. However, this estimate of neurometric sensitiv-
ity has been recently adjusted downward by showing that monkeys
use only the ﬁrst few hundred milliseconds of a stimulus, while
the neurometric integration time in the original study extended
to the full stimulus presentation of 2 s. Thus, the neurons were
unfairly favored in the earlier study (Cohen and Newsome, 2009).
In addition, it needs to be pointed out that these pioneers actually
based their estimate of the neurometric sensitivity on two neurons,
and not (as is often falsely understood) on a single neuron. The
neurometric sensitivity was calculated from the measured neuron
(selected to display high directionality), combined with a virtual
one, the“antineuron”,with opposite direction selectivity but other-
wise identical response properties. In fact, the task to discriminate
two stimulus directions does not ﬁt well the properties of a sin-
gle MT neuron, which, due to its high directional selectivity, is
limited to convey information about the presence of a stimulus
in a single preferred direction, and largely ignores the presence of
stimuli in other directions. As a consequence, single MT neuron
discriminability to two opposite directions is presumably far lower
than claimed in the original study (Britten et al., 1992). Notably,
other studies with the neurometric analysis strategy of postulating
antineurons also found considerable fractions of neurons whose
sensitivity exceeded that of the observer (MT: Uka and DeAngelis,
2003; MST: Heuer and Britten, 2004). A perhaps more suitable
psychophysical task to probe the sensitivity of MT neurons would
be the detection of movement direction along the neuron’s pre-
ferred axis vs. zero net motion, which to our knowledge has not
been tried so far. These points hardly diminish the impact of these
landmark studies, but they suggest the view that single MT cells
are likely to fall in line with neurons in many other sensory areas
investigated since then, showing neurometric sensitivities to be
somewhat lower than psychometric sensitivity.
With the common ﬁnding of NP sensitivity ratios of close to 1
but not exceeding it, it is typically very easy to combine neuromet-
ric performance of far fewer neurons than the number suspected
(or known) to be engaged in the task to exceed the performance of
the subject. Popular responses to this problem have been to postu-
late (i) sources of noise in downstream processing, (ii) detrimental
effects introduced by neuronal correlations, or (iii) intricacies of
read-out mechanisms. Despite their value as testable hypothe-
ses, these possibilities must be deemed highly under-constrained
without a direct assessment of the complete neuronal population,
even though some of them – such as neuronal correlations – have
received experimental support (Zohary et al., 1994; Cohen and
Newsome, 2008).
In conclusion, future NP comparisons are likely to go beyond
measurements of spike counts from single units with the aim to
identify neuronal population codes. To do this, informational bot-
tlenecks must be studied. The only attainable complete bottleneck
in the central nervous system is the population of retinal ganglion
cells, which should be further exploited for this purpose. In the
peripheral nervous system, somatosensory afferents are equally
attractive. Artiﬁcial bottlenecks must be extended to activity that
evolves in space and time to identify neuronal activity leading
to more complex perception. Juxtacellular stimulation of single
neurons can be employed to systematically test activity varying
over time (Houweling et al., 2010).Optogenetic approaches,which
already allow to interfere with a genetically targeted population of
cells, are a promising new tool to achieve this goal with amazing
spatiotemporal precision (Yizhar et al., 2011), even in non-human
primates (Diester et al., 2011).
ESTIMATING PSYCHOMETRIC SENSITIVITY
Sensations are not directly observable in the laboratory. Instead,
the subject in a psychophysical experiment (observer) is asked to
produce different responses contingent on particular aspects of
his sensations. This could be the mere presence or absence of a
sensation (stimulus detection), whether two stimuli are perceived
to be different (stimulus discrimination), whether a stimulus is
a speciﬁc one in a set of candidates (identiﬁcation), or whether
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a given stimulus belongs to a speciﬁc category of stimuli (cat-
egorization). In the early days of psychophysics, the behavioral
response was simply seen as the effect of a stimulus once its
intensity exceeded a sensory threshold. The threshold could be
estimated by varying the stimulus intensity andmeasuring the per-
centage of correct responses (Figure 1A).However,psychophysical
ﬁndings varied considerably both across tasks and across labora-
tories, prompting psychophysicists to develop more reproducible
methods (Blackwell, 1952; Swets, 1961a,b; Swets et al., 1961). The
decision-theoretic stance of SDT (Green and Swets, 1966) alerted
experimenters to the fact that psychophysical measurements hinge
crucially on non-sensory factors, among them prior probabilities,
payoffs, and task strategy, thus recognizing the active role of the
observer. Importantly, SDT’s main index of psychophysical sensi-
tivity (d ′) promised improved replicability of results across both
tasks and laboratories. The ensuing success of SDT yielded a sharp
increase in the use of its concepts, such as ROC analysis, across var-
ious ﬁelds of research (Swets, 1973). The power of these ideas is
reﬂected also in themeasurement of neurometric data.When com-
paring them to psychometric data, neurometric discriminability is
often measured by ROC analysis (Vogels and Orban, 1990; Britten
et al., 1992, 1996; Parker and Newsome, 1998). If decisional factors
play a role for the behavioral response in psychophysical tasks, it is
reasonable to deploy their manipulation for the study of percep-
tual processes. As a consequence, the focus in the last decade has
shifted away from neuronal sensitivity toward the study of per-
ceptual decision-making. It is now asked how and to what degree
sensory representations also reﬂect the behavioral choice (Brit-
ten et al., 1996; Romo and Salinas, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Nienborg and Cumming, 2009, 2010). A more recent development
has been to go beyond varying stimulus parameters and explicitly
vary payoffs and/or the frequency of the stimuli to study directly
how representations of stimulus and choice correspond and inter-
act (Feng et al., 2009; Rorie et al., 2010; Teichert and Ferrara, 2010;
Stüttgen et al., 2011).
Despite these developments, the psychophysical task – at least
when used to measure neuronal sensitivities – has, by and large,
been considered merely a means to measure responses. Typically,
the minimization of extra-sensory factors is considered as a given.
Against the backdrop of the insights gained by SDT half a century
ago about the psychological nature of even the simplest sensory
detection tasks, it gives cause of concern how little possible effects
of extra-sensory factors on the psychometric curve are discussed.
Our goal in this review is to remind the reader that all parameters
of the psychometric curve depend on the detailed procedure and
will, thus, signiﬁcantly affect the estimation of psychometric sen-
sitivity and thereby the NP ratio. Each psychophysical task comes
with different memory requirements, constraints on information
processing, and effects on motivation and bias that limit the use
of sensory information. In order to study how sensory informa-
tion processing works – even at the sensor level – ultimately these
more “psychological” factors have to be taken into account. We
will start with a brief review of SDT and an analysis of cognitive
processes underlying performance in commonly employed psy-
chophysical tasks. Then, we will discuss additional non-stimulus
factors outside the SDT framework thatmay signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the subject’s responses.
SDT ANALYSIS OF THE YES/NO TASK
The vast majority of researchers undertaking the NP compari-
son employ Go–NoGo (GNG), yes/no (YN), or Forced-Choice
(FC) tasks (see Box 1, Table 1, and Figure 2 for brief descrip-
tions of these and some other psychophysical tasks). SDT offers
a broad conceptual framework for the analysis of different psy-
chophysical tasks. Here, we will illustrate SDT concepts mainly
with YN and FC. The interested reader is referred to MacMil-
lan and Creelman (2005) for further paradigms and discus-
sion.
Signal detection theory starts with the assumption that each
presentation of a signal yields a variable internal representation
on a hypothetical decision axis. Similarly, even in the absence of
sensory input, the system generates a non-zero, somewhat variable
response. In the simplest and most widely used case, the distrib-
utions of the internal representation of both stimulus (S) and
noise (N) are assumed to be normal and their variances identical
(Figure 3).
The task can be conceptualized as a statistical decision prob-
lem. The observer is assumed to partition the decision axis into
the discrete response options that are available to him: “yes”, a sig-
nal was present, and “no”, no signal was present (a similar logic
applies to discrimination tasks). On each trial, there are four pos-
sible outcomes: (1) a signal is presented, and the observer responds
“signal” (hit), (2) a signal is presented, and the observer responds
“no signal” (miss), (3) no signal is presented, and the observer
responds “signal” (false alarm), and (4) no signal is presented, and
the observer responds “no signal” (correct rejection). Cases 1 and
4 are correct responses; cases 2 and 3 are false. Given this exper-
imental setup, a payoff matrix assigns a value to each of the four
possible outcomes. Usually, correct responses are equally likely to
yield reinforcement, and reinforcers are of the same magnitude
for cases 1 and 4. Incorrect responses are usually punished, and
again punishments are of the same magnitude for cases 2 and
3. If this is the case, and the stimuli are equally likely to occur,
the observer’s optimal (in the sense of maximizing accuracy, and
therefore expected payoff) decision criterion is located right in the
middle between the two stimulus distributions. Thus, the proba-
bility of hits equals that of correct rejections, and the probability
of false alarms equals that of misses. The discriminability of the
two stimuli, N and S, is given by the difference of means of the
two stimulus distributions on the decision variable, divided by the
common standard deviation (SD) of the distributions. This mea-
sure is called d ′. SDT separates sensory discriminability (indexed
by d ′) and response bias, which is the distance of the decision cri-
terion from a neutral position (a measure called c), and therefore,
at least in theory, provides a measure of sensitivity untainted by
response bias. This separation is of great value because the usual
index of performance in psychophysics, percent correct, is known
to be highly susceptible to variations in task structure and response
bias (Green and Swets, 1966).
SDT ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-INTERVAL FORCED CHOICE TASK
A classic example for how SDT can help relate different psy-
chophysical tasks is the relationship between YN and two-interval
forced choice (2-IFC; the same applies to spatial two-alternative
forced choice, 2-AFC). In a simple instantiation of 2-IFC, the
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Box 1 Description of psychophysical tasks
Go–NoGo (GNG)
The observer has one response option R available (e.g., pressing or releasing a lever, performing a nose poke, or pecking a response key)
and is required to respond when a stimulus of class A is presented and not to respond when a stimulus of class B is presented.The outline
of a typical trial is depicted in Figure 2A. After an inter-trial interval (ITI), a stimulus is presented. If the subject responds within a given time
frame (the “response window”) after target onset, reward is delivered; in case of a response after a non-target stimulus, punishment is
delivered.
The biggest advantage of the GNG method is its simplicity. Animals are easily trained on GNG using intense, suprathreshold stimuli. Con-
sequently, the intensity difference between the stimuli in classes A and B is gradually reduced, until no further improvement is possible
(see Schwarz et al., 2010, for a methods review). Then, presenting a pseudorandom sequence of several stimuli (“method of constant
stimuli”), the response probability for each stimulus is recorded, and a psychometric curve can be constructed (detection: Stüttgen et al.,
2006, discrimination: Gerdjikov et al., 2010).
Note that this description refers to an instantiation of the yes/no task (a single stimulus per trial) in the form of a Go–NoGo paradigm. Of
course, GNG can also be conducted with two stimuli per trial as in two-interval forced choice (see below).
Yes/no (YN; also known as A Not-A or single-interval forced choice)
The observer has two response options RA and RB available and is required to respond with “RA” when stimulus A is presented and with
“RB” when stimulus B is presented. Rather than two individual stimuli, A and B can be classes of stimuli, e.g., leftward and rightward
motion of various strengths.The outline of a typical trial is depicted in Figure 2B. After an inter-trial interval (ITI), a stimulus taken from either
class A or class B is presented. If the observer emits the appropriate response within a given time frame (response window), reward is
delivered; if the incorrect response is emitted, the subject is punished, usually by a brief time-out. In many monkey studies, the response
consists in making a saccade to one of two choice targets. The term “yes/no” derives from main usage of the paradigm in studies of
stimulus detection in the early days of psychophysics. However, use of theYN method is not limited to detection but is employed in studies
of discrimination performance as well. Notably, many neuroscience papers list this paradigm as a “forced-choice task” (e.g., Britten et al.,
1992), or “two-choice task” (Kepecs et al., 2008). Sometimes theYN-method is referred to as “single-interval forced choice.” Although this
terminology has some conceptual appeal, we will avoid this term lest we add to the terminological confusion. Note that, in signal detection
theoretical contexts, the YN method is typically understood to employ only two stimuli per block of trials (the consequences of departure
from this rule are discussed in the main text). In addition, psychophysicists sometimes refer to a yes/no task with more than two stimuli as
the “method of single stimuli.” Here we will use the term “yes/no task” for any task in which a single stimulus is presented per trial and in
which the subject has two response options available, regardless of the total number of stimuli in the stimulus set.
Yes/no with reference (YNR)
This method is similar to the yes/no task described above with two different stimuli per trial. On each trial, a reference stimulus is presented
ﬁrst; then, a second stimulus (target) is presented. The subject’s task is to judge whether the target stimulus is more or less intense than
the reference stimulus along some sensory continuum.The rationale in usingYNR is to avoid decrements in performance due to bad recall
of the reference stimulus’ features (stimulus uncertainty; see, e.g., Hautus et al., 2009).
Identification
The subject is presented with one of m stimuli in a single interval and has to emit one of m possible responses. Hence, the yes/no method
with two stimuli is a special case of an identiﬁcation task with only two responses. In cases where there are two responses which are not
thought of as literally “yes” and “no”, such as leftward vs. rightward motion, identiﬁcation might be a better term thanYN.
Same-different
The observer is presented with two stimuli, either simultaneously or in succession, and has to judge whether they are the same or different.
The position or the sequence of the two stimuli in a pair is randomized. UnlikeYNR, the ﬁrst stimulus in this task is not identical across trials.
Forced Choice
This task can take many forms. In the most common application (the “n-interval forced choice task”, n-IFC), there are n stimuli on each
trial, and the observer has to choose a target out of n −1 distractor stimuli. In tactile psychophysics, a common implementation is the
two-interval forced choice task (2-IFC, e.g., Luna et al., 2005; Figure 2C). Here, a stimulus is presented for a brief interval of time (e.g., 1 s),
which is followed by a short inter-stimulus interval, and the presentation of a second stimulus. The subject has to decide which of the two
stimuli the target is (e.g., which stimulus is of larger intensity or higher frequency). If 2-IFC is used to assess detection performance, one of
the stimuli is the null stimulus, the other one is the target. Another implementation of forced choice is the spatial n-alternative forced-choice
method (n-AFC, Figure 2D): on each trial, n stimuli are presented on a screen in front of the subject, who has to pick the target stimulus
(e.g., Jacobs et al., 2009; see also Jäkel and Wichmann, 2006).
Incidentally, FC can also be instantiated as a GNG task, e.g., by asking the subject to respond when it believes the ﬁrst stimulus to be the
target, and to withhold responding when it believes otherwise.
A note on terminology
It is important to note the discordant uses of psychophysical terms in the animal neuro-psychophysics and the psychological literature. In
forced choice methods (psychological use), the observer is always presented with multiple stimuli per trial, either in temporal succession
(n-IFC) or simultaneously (e.g., at different spatial locations, n-AFC). An inconsistency of this terminology is thatYN tasks are not commonly
called FC, although they do feature a forced choice component (they require the observer to emit one of two responses on each trial). This
is probably the reason why animal studies often call YN tasks FC, bearing the danger that characteristics of the different tasks that critically
relate to the comparison of neurometric and psychometric data slip out of focus and get neglected (see main text). Here we adopt the
psychological terminology (which is consistent with signal detection theory, see also Section 2.3.5 in Kingdom and Prins, 2010), despite
the mentioned inconsistency; accordingly, many of the paradigms called “forced choice” in the neuroscience literature are referred to as
yes/no method in the present review.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience November 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 125 | 6
Stüttgen et al. Mapping spikes to sensations
Table 1 | Overview over the most frequently used tasks in animal psychophysics and their properties.
Number of
stimuli per
trial
Number of
response
options
Working
memory for
stimulus
required?
Susceptibility
to bias
Example for
a putative
process
model
Example
studies
Motor Interval Motivation
Go–NoGo 1 (but may
vary)
1 No ++ n/a ++ Encode S –
compare to C
stored in LTM –
decide whether to
respond
Cook and Maunsell (2002),
Stüttgen et al. (2006),
Mehta et al. (2007), Palmer
et al. (2007), Stüttgen and
Schwarz (2008, 2010),
Gerdjikov et al. (2010),
O’Connor et al. (2010a,b),
Frederick et al. (2011)
Yes/no 1 2 No + n/a 0 Encode S –
compare to C
stored in LTM –
decide which
response to emit
Britten et al. (1992, 1996),
Krupa et al. (2001), de
Lafuente and Romo (2005),
Frederick et al. (2011), von
Heimendahl et al. (2007)
Yes/no with
reference
2 2 Depends
on strategy
+ n/a 0 Encode R –
transfer to WM –
encode S –
compare S&R –
decide
Mountcastle et al. (1990),
Purushothaman and
Bradley (2005), Qin et al.
(2009), also see Lee et al.
(2007), Hautus et al. (2009)
Same-different 2 2 Depends
on strategy
+ + 0 Encode S1 –
transfer to WM –
encode S2 –
compare – decide
Vogels and Orban (1990)
m-Interval
forced choice
m m Yes + + 0 For m =2:
encode S1 –
transfer to WM –
encode S2 –
compare – decide
Hernandez et al. (1997),
Luna et al. (2005)
Spatial
m-alternative
forced choice
m m No + n/a 0 For m =2:
encode S1 and S2
(simultaneously or
sequentially?) –
compare – decide
Mentzer (1966), Knut-
sen et al. (2006), Jacobs
et al. (2009), Adibi and
Arabzadeh (2011), Busse
et al. (2011)
S, stimulus; S1, ﬁrst stimulus; S2, second stimulus; RM, reminder; C, criterion; WM, working memory; LTM, long-term memory; ++, strong; +, moderate, 0, weak,
n/a, not applicable.
observer is confronted with two different stimuli per trial; let
us assume these are the same two stimuli that have been used
previously in the YN task. The observer is presented with both
stimuli on each trial, but each stimulus is assigned randomly to
one of two successive temporal intervals. The observer’s task is
to designate which interval contained the target. Hence, contrary
to the YN task, where the subject observes a sample from either
the signal or the noise distribution on each trial, here the subject
gets one sample from each without knowing which one is pre-
sented in which of the two intervals. The optimal strategy in this
case is to take the difference between the two values and base the
decision on the sign of the difference. Figure 4 shows the two
distributions that arise when the decision is based on the samples’
difference. They represent the cases when (a) the ﬁrst interval
contained the target (S → N ) and (b) the second interval con-
tained the target (N → S). In the ﬁrst case, the distribution of
the differences will be centered on the mean of the S distribution
minus the mean of the N distribution – thus, the mean differ-
ence will be d ′ as would be obtained in a yes/no task (henceforth
referred to as d ′YN ), with a variance of
√
2. In the second case,
the distribution of the differences will be centered on the mean
of N minus the mean of S, again with a variance of
√
2, but with
a mean of −d ′YN. Consequently, the distance of the two distri-
butions is 2∗d ′YN. However, because of the increased variance,
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FIGURE 2 | Sequence of events in four tasks commonly employed in
animal psychophysics. (A) Go–NoGo task. (B)Yes/no task. (C)Two-interval
forced choice task. (D) Spatial two-alternative forced choice task.
FIGURE 3 | Signal detection theoretical process model of performance
in the yes/no task. See main text for details.
d ′ in the 2-IFC task ( d ′FC ) is
2∗d ′YN√
2 = d ′YN∗
√
2. Translated
to correct performance, if chance performance equals 50%, this
corresponds to an increase from 84% to 92% correct if d ′YN = 1.
Thus, SDT predicts that an observer (if he adopts the optimal
strategy) will have a
√
2 times higher discriminability (indexed
by d ′YN ) in a 2-IFC task than in a YN task with the very same
two stimuli, i.e., d ′FC =
√
2∗d ′YN. Indeed, this prediction was
approximately conﬁrmed in some studies (Swets, 1959) but not
in others (Yeshurun et al., 2008).
THE STIMULUS SET AND PRIOR PROBABILITIES
In most neurophysiological experiments, animals are presented
with more than two stimuli varying in their discriminability. Each
pair of stimuli has a speciﬁc d ′ that can be measured in anYN task
as described above.Hence, each stimulus is assumed to give rise to a
Gaussian distribution on the decision axis. How should the subject
respond if we showed all stimuli randomized in one and the same
block of an experiment? In Figure 5A, an observer is confronted
with two stimulus categories,S1 andS2. S1 consists of a single stim-
ulus (the noise-only stimulus N ), S2 consists of ﬁve stimuli (each
with a different d ′ compared to N ). All six stimuli occur with equal
probability (1/6) and the subject’s task is to “detect” any stimulus
that is greater than S1 in a simple YN task. The rightmost panel
illustrates overall proportion of correct responses as a function of
criterion placement. The resulting psychometric curve is depicted
in Figure 5E (magenta), an example detection study which used
such a stimulus set is Stüttgen et al. (2006).
Now consider a somewhat different situation: the stimuli are
identical to those described above, but presentation of S1 is as
likely as presentation of all stimuli in S2 taken together – thus
p(S1)= 0.5, p(S2)= 0.5, and p(S2i)= 0.5/5= 0.1 for stimulus i,
where i ∈{1,2,3,4,5}. The optimal decision criterion has shifted
considerably, and overall accuracy has dropped by 10% (see
Figure 5B). The resulting psychometric function is shown in
Figure 5E (blue), illustrating a marked reduction in the propor-
tion of “S2” responses across all stimuli (for an example study, see
Gerdjikov et al., 2010).
Imagine yet another situation: the observer is confronted with
only two stimuli per session, S1 and one of the stimuli in cate-
gory S2, in a series of YN experiments. This case is illustrated for
two hardly distinguishable stimuli (Figure 5C) and two easily dis-
tinguishable stimuli (Figure 5D). For each of ﬁve possible pairs,
percentage of correct responses can be calculated and used to con-
struct a psychometric curve (Figure 5E, green). Of course, one
could also conduct ﬁve consecutive 2-AFC or 2-IFC tasks, yield-
ing somewhat higher performance (Figure 5E, red). As outlined
in the previous section, 2-AFC/2-IFC performance (red) is con-
sistently higher than YN performance (green) for ideal observers.
This exercise illustrates an important point: psychophysical perfor-
mance,measured in proportion correct responses, can be different
under different tasks or even within the same task when identical
stimuli occur with different probabilities. Notably, performance
across tasks looks identical when transformed into the same unit
of sensitivity, such as d ′YN.
THE MINIMALLY INFORMED OBSERVER
We can use the previous example to make another point. Regard-
ing the NP comparison, it is crucial that the performance of the
neurons is considered under the same constraints as the subject.
In NP comparisons, the term “ideal observer” is often used very
loosely to describe the optimal performance that an observer could
achieve in the task given the neural recordings and some assump-
tions about the neural code. There is, however, also the question of
how much of the task and the stimuli is known to the observer. In
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FIGURE 4 | Signal detection theoretical process model of performance in the 2-AFC task. See main text for details.
order to distinguish an observer that has all the information avail-
able that is also available to the experimenter (and might hence
be called ideal) from the situation that the subject is in, Boneau
and Cole (1967) coined the term “minimally informed observer”
for a model that only uses the information that is available to the
subject and nothing more.
Assume the subject is confronted with the situation depicted
in Figure 5B – an YN task in which the S1 stimulus presentation
probability is the same as that of all S2-stimuli together. In paral-
lel, unit recordings from sensory neurons were obtained, and the
experimenter wishes to relate the subject’s performance to that
of single neurons. The experimenter could, for example, compute
ROC curves from the neuronal data for each pair of S1–S2 stimuli,
and integrate the area under the ROC. The area under the ROC
curve will correspond to the performance in a 2-AFC task if the
difference model of SDT is correct and hence requires a correction
of
√
2 to be comparable to an YN task. In Figure 5E, this amounts
to a transition from the red to the green curve. Still, the neuron
would be unfairly favored, since the analysis assumes a sequence
of YN tasks with only two stimuli per block, while the observer
was faced with six stimuli simultaneously. Contrary to the exper-
imenter the observer does not know which stimulus is shown on
each trial. Thus, the only possible strategy for the observer is to
adopt a single decision criterion, as shown in Figure 5B. Optimal
performance would accordingly result in the blue psychometric
function in Figure 5E, and this is the correct analysis to apply to
the neuronal data: to ﬁnd a criterion which maximizes the per-
centage of correct responses when multiple stimuli can appear.
Studies in which this procedure was applied include de Lafuente
and Romo (2005) and Palmer et al. (2007).
PROCESS MODELS FOR PSYCHOPHYSICAL PERFORMANCE
Given the success of SDT in ﬁtting psychophysical data, it is
tempting to think of the calculations involved as actual cognitive
processes. For theYN task, the sequence of steps canbe conceptual-
ized as follows: (1) encode the stimulus into the decision variable,
(2) compare current value of the decision variable to the deci-
sion criterion retrieved from long-term memory, (3) decide on a
response (Figure 3; see also Tanner, 1961). A process model for
the GNG task with one stimulus per trial would be identical to
that for YN, the difference being that, in YN, the observer has
two response options (aside from non-task behavior), while in
GNG, the observer has only one. Gomez et al. (2007) tested for-
mal models of GNG and conclude that core processes of GNG and
YN may be identical under some circumstances.
Two-interval forced choice is more complicated because there
exist more than one process model for appropriate (but also sub-
optimal) behavior. (a) The observer could ignore the stimulus in
the ﬁrst interval altogether and treat this task as an YN task, bas-
ing his decisions only on sensory evidence gathered in the second
interval; (b) he could do the converse and base his decisions only
on the ﬁrst interval. In these two cases, we would expect that he
performs just the same way with two stimuli as in the yes/no task.
Another strategy (c) that will give the same performance with
regard to percent correct would be to perform two times YN in
succession. If the stimulus is detected in neither interval, or if it is
falsely detected in both, a random response is produced.Otherwise
the interval in which a stimulus was detected is chosen.Yet, there is
a fourth, the optimal strategy, (d) that was already discussed above
(illustrated in Figure 4).
The important thing tonote here is that, for a givenpsychophys-
ical task, there may be more than one decision strategy to follow.
It is often a convenient assumption that subjects follow the opti-
mal strategy, but we must not forget that in most studies that
conduct NP comparisons it is only an assumption. Consequently,
both the processing required to yield a decision variable and the
resulting performance may differ from subject to subject. Even if
the sensory front end as an input to the system is ﬁxed, subjects
may use the available information in various, potentially subop-
timal, ways. The 2-IFC task can however be adapted to force the
animal to pay attention to both stimuli; see Romo and Salinas
(2003).
A similar caveat as for 2-IFC applies to the use of the yes/no
task with a reference stimulus (YNR, see Box 1), as for example
used in Mountcastle et al. (1990); Purushothaman and Bradley
(2005), Qin et al. (2009), and Bizley et al., 2010; also see Lee et al.,
2007; Hautus et al., 2009). An analysis of the YNR task is depicted
in Figure 6. Here, two stimuli per trial are presented. However,
unlike 2-AFC/2-IFC, the ﬁrst stimulus (reference, R) is identical
for each trial, and the subject has to decide whether the second
stimulus is more or less intense than R on some stimulus dimen-
sion. Again, the task is ambiguous as to its decision strategy. One
strategy (the optimal one) is to ignore R completely and concen-
trate only on the second stimulus for decision-making. That way,
YNR reduces to YN (Figure 6A). This assumes, of course, that
all stimuli are known exactly to the subject. R is, however, only
introduced because the experimenter thinks that this is not the
case. One suboptimal strategy that seems likely is hence to (1)
encode R, (2) encode the second stimulus, (3) take their differ-
ence, and (4) decide according to the sign of the difference; if
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FIGURE 5 | Illustration how different stimulus presentation
probabilities and different ROC-analysis strategies may yield disparate
estimates of sensory performance. (A)The total stimulus set comprises
six different stimuli, ﬁve of which correspond to S2 (gray distributions, blue
distribution is the sum of ﬁve individual ones) and one corresponds to S1
(red). All six stimuli occur with equal probability (means: 100:10:150) and
have identical SD (20). Middle panel: depending on the location of the
response criterion on the decision axis, different sets of probabilities of a
correct response exist. For each possible criterion on the abscissa, the
corresponding accuracies for each stimulus can be read off the ordinate.
Right panel: overall proportion of correct responses (across all stimuli) as a
function of criterion placement. Vertical line indicates optimal criterion
placement. (B) As in (A), but probability of S1 and S2 are equal (0.5 each);
within the S2 category, all stimuli are equally probable (p=0.1). For the
same set of stimuli as in a, the optimal criterion is shifted considerably to
the right, and the overall proportion of correct responses drops from 0.84 to
0.75. (C) As in (A), but showing performance in a two-stimulus yes/no task
with S1 and one stimulus out of S2 with the weakest signal strength. (D) As
in (A), but showing performance in a two-stimulus yes/no task with S1 and
one stimulus out of S2 with strongest signal strength. (E) Psychometric
functions for different task conditions: magenta, task as in (A), blue, task as
in (B), green: psychometric curve resulting from a sequence of separate
yes/no experiments where stimuli are presented pairwise and in blocks (i.e.,
S2 vs. S1–S1, S2 vs. S1–S2, S2 vs. S1–S3 etc.), red: psychometric curve
resulting from a sequence of 2-AFC experiments where stimuli are
presented pairwise and in blocks.
positive, the second stimulus is deemed more intense (Figure 6B).
This strategy is identical to the fourth strategy discussed in the
context of the 2-IFC task; but this time, it yields suboptimal per-
formance, decreasing 98% correct performance to 92% in the
example. Furthermore, because of the ambiguity in task execution,
it is unknown which neurometric analysis is most appropriate for
this case.
One study actually demonstrated that, in YNR, animals ignore
the reference stimulus and thereby follow the optimal strategy.
Hernandez et al. (1997) trained monkeys to discriminate between
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FIGURE 6 | Signal detection theoretical process models of
performance in the yes/no task with reference stimulus. (A)
Stimulus distributions along the decision variable under the optimal
strategy. The reference stimulus sample is ignored on every trial, and
thus the task reduces to the familiar yes/no task. (B) Stimulus
distributions along the decision variable under the suboptimal strategy,
when subjects decide on the basis of the difference of the ﬁrst and the
second sample.
two vibrotactile stimuli of different frequency. Monkeys were
presented with a base stimulus ﬁrst and a comparison stimu-
lus second, and they had to judge whether the frequency of the
comparison stimulus was higher than that of the base stimulus.
Importantly, when the reference stimulus was omitted in control
experiments, psychophysical performance did not change, sug-
gesting that the reference stimulus has indeed been ignored by the
animals. Also, when conditions were changed such that both base
and comparison frequency varied randomly from trial to trial,
performance dropped to chance levels, indicating that the ani-
mals did not perform the subtraction strategy as delineated above
(Figure 6B).
While process models inspired by SDT make clear predictions
for comparing performance across different psychophysical tasks,
data supporting these models as description of an observer’s deci-
sion strategy is sparse and conﬂicting. For example,Yeshurun et al.
(2008) reexamined several claims about the 2-IFC method. They
found, contrary to widespread belief, that the 2-IFC task is not
unbiased: observers consistently prefer one of the two intervals,
and this preference could not be explained by attentional state,
complexity of the stimulus display, interstimulus interval (ISI), or
experience of the observers. That 2-IFC is usually not unbiasedwas
also remarked on by Klein (2001) and the topic was recently revis-
ited by Garcia-Perez and Alcala-Quintana (2011) in a reanalysis of
a large number of datasets. Moreover, sensitivity during the two
intervals may differ: Yeshurun et al. (2008) provide some exper-
imental evidence that d ′ in the ﬁrst interval is larger than d ′ in
the second interval. Similar observations have been reported and
commented on by other authors (Nachmias, 2006;Ulrich andVor-
berg,2009;Ulrich,2010). This asymmetry could be due tomemory
limitations, i.e., only a portion of the information from the ﬁrst
interval is retained, or due to perceptual interactions between the
two presentation intervals. Importantly, Yeshurun et al. (2008)
found no evidence that d ′ in 2-IFC is d ′YN∗
√
2, as postulated by
SDT. Thus, the standard SDT-difference model of 2-IFC perfor-
mance was rejected, and the authors conclude that “we do not
currently know how to model what observers actually do in 2-IFC
tasks and that we have no reason to think that models appropri-
ate to one choice of stimuli can be generalized to others.” In a
similar vein, Jäkel and Wichmann (2006) compared 2-IFC with
spatial 2-AFC and spatial four-alternative forced-choice (4-AFC)
in a contrast detection task and found that, surprisingly, 2-IFC
with foveal stimulation produced the highest thresholds and 4-
AFC with more peripheral stimulation the lowest thresholds in
naïve observers, but not in a highly experienced one. In a dis-
crimination task with similar stimuli, 4-AFC did produce higher
thresholds than 2-IFC, as expected. Although their data do not
allow a clear interpretation of how the psychometric functions
from the different tasks relate to each other, the authors speculate
that extra-sensory factors, like sensory memory and spatial atten-
tion, have different effects in different tasks. It is noteworthy that
these extra-sensory effects are ignored in SDT.
On the neurometric side it makes sense to calculate sensitivity
using the optimal procedure in order to get an upper bound on
the performance that an ideal observer could achieve based on
the neural data. We usually also assume that the whole observer
behaves optimally when calculating psychometric sensitivity. We
have to be aware,however, that the actual sensitivity of the observer
may be higher than observed, since he may be using the infor-
mation that is available to him in a suboptimal way. Ideally,
obtained psychometric functions should index “true sensitivity” –
i.e., measure discrimination performance of a sensory system and
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be unaffected by choice of psychophysical method, variations in
motivation, responsemeasure,or response topography. The simul-
taneous measurement of neuronal and behavioral responses is
considered the gold standard for conducting the NP comparison,
because neuronal responses are not altered by anesthesia, the ani-
mal is actively engaged in the task, and stimulus variability across
trials affects neurons and observer alike (Parker and Newsome,
1998). Thatway, important confounds inherent in comparingneu-
rometric and psychometric data from different animals, such as
plasticity of sensory representations during learning (Polley et al.,
2004) or task-dependent changes in interneuronal correlations
(Cohen and Newsome, 2008) are avoided. However, as outlined
above, simultaneous acquisition of neurometric and psychome-
tric data is not sufﬁcient for conducting valid NP comparisons,
because task-speciﬁc (and -unspeciﬁc, see below) factors may
affect psychophysical performance without affecting neuromet-
ric performance. As a consequence, psychophysical performance
will frequently fall short of true sensitivity.
ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING MEASURED DISCRIMINABILITY
Psychometric discrimination and detection performance for iden-
tical stimuli have been shown to be affected not only by type of task
(see preceding section), but by a variety of other factors as well.
SDT explicitly acknowledges the role of prior presentation prob-
ability and reinforcement history of the stimuli, but there exists a
wide range of factors which, we believe, have been largely ignored
in previous work. In the following paragraphs, we will review
some non-sensory factors that are known to affect psychophys-
ical performance. A short list of important factors in conducting
NP comparisons is provided in Table 2.
Learning, motivation, and fatigue
One would expect psychometric functions to change based on
learning and this is a good reason to work with highly trained
observers and only analyze the responses after their performance
does not improve anymore (Fine and Jacobs, 2002). This is of
course the case for most animal experiments, especially those
involving monkeys, even though some studies employing rats or
mice sometimes stop training when an arbitrary performance
Table 2 | Overview over the most frequent factors potentially affecting
the NP comparison.
Temporal uncertainty (stimulus onset and offset not made explicit in
detection task)
Stimulus uncertainty (presenting more than two stimuli per block of
trials, or presenting novel stimuli)
Stimuli for neurometric and psychometric data collection differ
appreciably
Neurometric data gathered with different animals, under anesthesia or
in vitro
Ambiguous task structure (e.g., yes/no with reminder)
Subject not trained to asymptotic performance
Subject lacks motivation
Subject is inattentive
Response bias
criterion of, e.g., 80–85% has been achieved. Nevertheless, even
within a session, a highly trained animal may show systematic
deviations from stationarity. In order to achieve a high level of
motivation, animals in psychophysical studies are usually food- or
water deprived. Nienborg and Cumming (2009) used a yes/no task
to assess disparity discrimination. They found that the delivery of
larger rewards led to increased performance as measured by the
slope of the psychometric function.
Hunger and satiety are known to offset response curves in
psychophysical GNG tasks. Boneau and Cole (1967) separated
response probabilities observed during the ﬁrst half of an exper-
imental session, when the subject was supposedly most hun-
gry, from the second half of the session, when the animal was
arguably less hungry; they observed a substantial decrease in over-
all response probability from the ﬁrst to the second half of the
session, which showed up at the level of the psychometric func-
tion as a shift of threshold. Similar effects are of course to be
expected when the subject gets tired. In order to detect such
non-stationarities, one possibility is to compute a rank-biserial
correlation between trial number and responses (e.g., 1 for correct
and 0 for incorrect; see Stüttgen and Schwarz, 2008). Ideally, the
correlation should be 0. If the correlation assumes negative values,
the number of correct responses is increasing over the duration of
the session. As another means to detect such effects, Wichmann
and Hill (2001a,b) describe a statistical test that uses the order of
the blocks in a constant stimuli design to predict the residuals for
the ﬁt of the psychometric function. Fruend et al. (2011) assess
the severity of such violations on the estimation of psychomet-
ric functions and suggest a suitable correction for the resulting
conﬁdence intervals.
Attention
Animals are presumably inattentive to the task a signiﬁcant por-
tion of the time. In principle, this problem is unrelated to the
psychophysical task employed, but it may be especially detrimen-
tal in GNG. Lapses of attention in GNG will tend to yield fewer
responses overall and thereby increase the measured threshold. In
GNG, the experimenter has noway to identify whether the absence
of a response in a given trial is indeed based on assessment of the
sensory evidence in a trial or due to non-sensory factors such
as lapse of attention or decreased motivation. However, even in
YN and FC, this may cause problems if the animal does not sim-
ply refrain from responding on such trials, but instead presses
buttons or makes saccades at random. To complicate issues fur-
ther, it could be that, beyond non-sensory inﬂuences on response
bias, sensitivity itself could be affected by ﬂuctuations of atten-
tion. For example, Treue and Martinez Trujillo (1999) reported
that tuning curves of neurons in MT are gain-controlled by atten-
tion. Assuming spike count as the relevant code, this could affect
performance if neurons tuned to the stimulus increased their ﬁr-
ing rate while the ﬁring rate of “comparison neurons” not tuned
for the stimulus, remained the same; in SDT terms, the mean of
the signal distribution would move away from the mean of the
noise distribution, yielding an increase in d ′. To control for ﬂuc-
tuations in attention within a session, experimenters can follow
strategies as suggested in the previous section on motivation and
fatigue.
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Working memory
InGNGandYN tasks,workingmemory is not required in the sense
that sensory information needs to be maintained over a short time
span, e.g., a visual or auditory signal (this is not meant to imply
that task execution is completely independent of working mem-
ory, as the animal needs to recall what task to perform,which lever
or button to press under what circumstances etc.). In 2-IFC, SDT
assumes perfect retention of the ﬁrst stimulus, regardless of the
ISI. If the sequence of the stimuli is seamless, no working memory
is needed and discriminability depends on the temporal contrast
of the two stimuli. In this case, the 2-IFC paradigm tests predom-
inantly sensory coding. If, however, the stimuli are separated by a
non-zero ISI, storing and retrieving stimulus properties in work-
ing memory plays a decisive role. Importantly, performance in
2-IFC is affected by the duration of the ISI. If the ISI is too long,
performance decreases (Harris et al., 2001). It is a welcome recent
development in neurophysiology that the mechanisms of sensory
working memory are under investigation (Romo et al., 1999). The
interplay between simple psychophysical paradigms and working
memory is certainly a worthwhile ﬁeld of theoretical and experi-
mental development (Machens et al., 2005). In any case, it is likely
that neurometrics in 2-IFC overestimate performance when sen-
sory neuron responses during the ﬁrst stimulus period are used,
rather than the memory trace of the ﬁrst stimulus as represented
by working memory neurons.
Sequential effects
Boneau et al. (1965) showed that, at the level of individual trials,
non-rewarded stimuli are more likely to elicit a response when
they immediately follow a rewarded trial (in a GNG task). In addi-
tion, Busse et al. (2011) report that animals tend to switch sides
after each trial, regardless of success or failure. Verplanck et al.
(1952) have shown that for human subjects trials in a detection
experiment are not independent – contrary to the usual assump-
tion, subsequent trials in a detection experiment were positively
correlated. If these effects were just due to higher cognitive effects,
like the gambler’s fallacy, then perhaps there would be hope that
their effects could be minimized by instruction or training. How-
ever, there are indications that the sequential effects are a trace of
the mechanisms that produce the observed behavior. For identiﬁ-
cation tasks (such as the YN task) it seems likely that the subject
needs to store the ideal stimuli in long-term memory and then
compares the stimulus on each trial to the stored representations
to decide on a response. However, Stewart et al. (2005) argue that
in many cases long-term memory is not necessary and that a sim-
ple mechanism that only compares the current stimulus to the
last trial can explain many aspects of the data. For detection tasks,
Treisman and Williams (1984) have argued that the sequential
effects arise through an adaptive setting of the criterion based on
previous trials. If this was the case then the ﬂuctuations in the
criterion should be taken into account when assessing a subject’s
sensitivity, e.g., by separating trials according to stimuli presented
in each preceding trial.
Stimulus set
The measured psychophysical discriminability of two given stim-
uli can depend on whether, which and how many other stimuli
constitute a stimulus set in an experimental session (Stüttgen,
unpublished data).
In many psychological experiments the stimulus range can
inﬂuence the behavior that one wants to measure, often with
unexpected results (Poulton, 1975). For example, Lages and Treis-
man (1998) show that a task that suggests comparison of a
stimulus to a reference stimulus from long-term memory is actu-
ally solved by the subject by taking into account the stimulus
range without recourse to the reference stimulus at all (a possi-
ble explanation for this can be found in Treisman and Williams,
1984).
A related problem is that, in many neurophysiological stud-
ies, details of the stimuli (e.g., retinal position, motion direction,
contrast etc.) are meticulously matched to the receptive ﬁeld prop-
erties of the neuron currently under study, in order to maximize
the chance that this neuron is actually involved in the psychophysi-
cal task. However, because this stimulus adaptation has to be done
for each single unit recording (see Britten et al., 1992), it may
have detrimental effects on the performance of the subject which
is required to generalize the task across a large variety of stimuli,
many of which it may never have seen before. For most sensory
areas, it is commonly assumed that the neural response to a stim-
ulus is thought to be largely unaffected by stimulus history, as
long as some reasonable ISI is provided. Accordingly, neural rep-
resentation of a given stimulus should remain unaltered by the
number of stimuli in a stimulus set, while psychophysical per-
formance is not. Therefore, experimenters should take care to
meet the assumptions of SDT lest the subjects exhibit suboptimal
performance.
Temporal and stimulus uncertainty
It is often neglected that ideal observer analysis of spike responses
using SDT (construction of ROC curves) requires some assump-
tions that are frequently not met by experimental conditions. SDT
analysis assumes that the observer knows everything about the
signal, including starting time, duration, phase, frequency, ampli-
tude, and location – a prerequisite sometimes referred to as “signal
speciﬁed exactly.” If experimental subjects are uncertain as to
any of these parameters, performance decreases (Shipley, 1960;
Swets et al., 1961; Green and Weber, 1980; Green and Forrest,
1989).
Many neuroscience studies aiming at the NP comparison vio-
late at least one of these assumptions; most often, multiple stimuli
are used per experimental block (see stimulus range), or the tim-
ing of the stimulus is held uncertain (e.g., de Lafuente and Romo,
2005; Stüttgen et al., 2006). Hernandez et al. (1997) compared
monkeys’ performance for vibrotactile frequency discrimination
in two different tasks: yes/no with reference stimulus and 2-IFC
with variable stimulus pairs across trials. The monkey’s difference
limina in the ﬁrst set of experiments were lower by ∼30% (thus,
sensitivity was higher). This effect is likely due to the added stim-
ulus uncertainty, because performance in the second experiment
would be expected to increase according to SDT. Assuming that
neural responses were not systematically affected by task type, the
NP comparisons would yield different results for the two sets of
experiments.
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WHICH TASK IS BEST SUITED FOR THE
NEUROMETRIC–PSYCHOMETRIC COMPARISON?
Blackwell (1952) systematically compared psychophysical meth-
ods for measuring visual thresholds in human subjects. He
concluded that the 2-IFC method is superior to YN on several
indices of quality, including reliability of threshold measurement
(variability of repeated assessments of threshold), vulnerability of
threshold measurement to non-sensory biasing factors (i.e., pro-
cedural factors such as background illumination,number, spacing,
and order of stimuli, whether feedback was provided, and whether
ﬁnancial incentives for optimal performance was offered), and
the absolute magnitude of the psychophysical threshold. Jäkel
and Wichmann (2006) reinvestigated this issue and conﬁrmed
Blackwell’s earlier results for a visual detection task – however,
only for experienced observers. For naïve observers, in contrast,
spatial 4-AFC was superior in terms of reliability, bias, sensory
determinacy, and efﬁciency of measurement. For animal subjects,
Mentzer (1966) has conducted similar comparisons of YN, 2-AFC,
and 4-AFC for light detection in pigeons, but could not ﬁnd any
performance differences. Frederick et al. (2011) conducted a com-
parison of GNG and YN for odor discrimination and also found
no evidence for major differences in resulting performance.
Most psychophysical studies employing unit recordings in pri-
mates have used the YN method, even though it is usually referred
to by another name (e.g., Britten et al., 1992, 1996; Dodd et al.,
2001; Uka and DeAngelis, 2003; Heuer and Britten, 2004; de
Lafuente and Romo, 2005; Nienborg and Cumming, 2006, 2007,
2009); some have used GNG (Cook and Maunsell, 2002; Palmer
et al., 2007); or some other method (YNR: Mountcastle et al.,
1990; Purushothaman and Bradley, 2005; Qin et al., 2009; Biz-
ley et al., 2010; same-different: Vogels and Orban, 1990). A series
of studies by the Romo group has consistently employed 2-IFC
(Romo et al., 1999; Hernandez et al., 2000; for review, see Romo
and Salinas, 2003). To our knowledge, psychophysics with con-
comitant unit recordings in other species – most notably rats and
mice – have so far almost exclusively relied on GNG (Stüttgen
et al., 2006; Mehta et al., 2007; Stüttgen and Schwarz, 2008, 2010;
Andermann et al., 2010; Gerdjikov et al., 2010; O’Connor et al.,
2010a,b) or YN (Krupa et al., 2001; Prigg et al., 2002; Feierstein
et al., 2006; vonHeimendahl et al., 2007;Kepecs et al., 2008; Freder-
ick et al., 2011). However, these species can be trained on FC tasks
as well (pigeons: spatial 2-AFC: Blough, 1971; 4-AFC: Mentzer,
1966;mice: 2-AFC, Jacobs et al., 2009; Busse et al., 2011;Haiss et al.,
submitted; rats: 2-AFC: Knutsen et al., 2006; Adibi andArabzadeh,
2011). We know of no study with these species which employed
the m-IFC task; still, since rats, mice, and pigeons are known to
learn delayed matching-to-sample problems (rats: Kesner et al.,
1996; mice: Goto et al., 2010; pigeons: Lissek and Güntürkün,
2004), it should be possible to train them on m-IFC as well. To
sum up, while most studies have so far employed YN, other meth-
ods seem feasible. It is common understanding in the community
of researchers (based on anecdotal evidence) that GNG is trained
faster than YN (but see Frederick et al., 2011), which again may
be trained faster than IFC. More effort is required to make all
psychophysical tasks routinely available for future psychophysical
research. Spatial m-AFC has the disadvantage that, since several
stimuli are presented simultaneously, it is difﬁcult to control for
repetitive shifts of attention during the course of a single trial,
and to attribute modulations in unit activity to any one stimu-
lus, as opposed to the entire stimulus display. m-IFC avoids this
problem because stimuli are presented successively. On the other
hand, m-IFC requires working memory for the stimulus during
the ISI (unless the interval is zero). In addition, all FC variants
(as well as YNR) leave room for different decision strategies (see
above), which need to be properly assessed before conducting the
NP comparison. GNG and YN methods have the advantage that
no sequential or simultaneous stimulus presentation is required.
Accordingly, no working memory for a sensory stimulus is nec-
essary, which potentially simpliﬁes the task. We believe that the
YN method is particularly well suited for NP comparisons. Unlike
GNG, lapses of attention, or impulsive responding do not directly
contaminate the response measure, compared to FC and YNR,
there are less degrees of freedom in terms of strategy to employ,
although we regret to say that there are no good data to back up
this claim, and these data are badly needed.
CONCLUSION
The comparison of neurometric and psychometric sensitivity is
fraught with problems. We have argued in this review that, in
stark contrast to estimation of neurometric sensitivity, problems
with the estimation of psychometric sensitivity have been largely
ignored in the literature on the physiology of perception. Never-
theless, on both sides signiﬁcant progress will be needed to make
NP measurements more precise. Here we list some recommenda-
tions for future work originating from the points raised in this
review.
On the neurometric side, we see the research program based
on recording single neurons while activating them with sensory
stimuli coming to an end. This approach has been invaluable
to demonstrate that the neurometric sensitivity of single cells
most often reaches close to (but hardly surpasses) that of the
observer, thus fostering a central tenet of theories of sparse cod-
ing, as predicted by Barlow and Mountcastle. However, beyond
showing sparse coding to be feasible in principle, this approach
helps little in elucidating the role of the large neural populations
activated even by near-threshold stimulation. The goal of today
must be to characterize the neuronal code of the population of
neurons carrying precisely the information leading to behavior.
The need to deﬁne and access informational bottlenecks renders
this a tough task. Retinal ganglion cells have been spotted to be
one such bottleneck and should be exploited further. The creation
of bottlenecks by juxtacellular stimulation and soon by optoge-
netic means will allow carrying this research program further
both in rodents and in monkeys. In passing, we point out that
bottlenecks can be found and/or created very easily in inverte-
brate model systems which sometimes employ just single or a few
neurons to carry lifesaving, and thus, evolutionary relevant infor-
mation. An instructive example has been provided by Roeder in
his studies of noctuid moths. These insects use auditory informa-
tion from just two neurons per ear to decide on different tactics
to escape foraging bats (Roeder, 1966). Insects exhibit complex
types of behavior, such as working memory and decision making
(Menzel and Giurfa, 2001; Pompilio et al., 2006). Also, they offer
exquisite experimental ﬂexibility in terms of genetic manipulation
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and optical imaging of neuronal function (Briggman et al., 2005;
Haehnel et al., 2009). Accordingly, invertebrates may serve as valu-
ablemodel systems to investigate the physiology of perception, and
to offer useful insights for the studies of mechanisms of perceptual
decision making in mammals.
On the psychometric side, the importance of task structure
and other non-sensory factors relevant for psychophysical perfor-
mance must be acknowledged. More effort is needed to validate
the measurements of psychometric sensitivity by deliberate vari-
ation of task structure while maintaining a constant stimulus set.
For instance, results fromYNR or FC studies that allow ambiguous
interpretations in terms of underlying cognitive processes can be
validated by applying YN tasks. Formal models of the cognitive
processes underlying different tasks need to be reﬁned and pit-
ted against each other both with purely behavioral tests (Gomez
et al., 2007; Jang et al., 2009; Wolfe and Van Wert, 2010; Freder-
ick et al., 2011; Stüttgen et al., 2011) and with neural recordings
(Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Churchland
et al., 2008; Kepecs et al., 2008). It is unclear what kind of
comparison process underlies perceptual decisions, i.e., what is
actually compared (Stüttgen et al., 2011). The effect of storing
sample stimuli and/or decision criteria in long-term and working
memory against which current sensory information can be com-
pared demands clariﬁcation. As shown in Figure 5, psychometric
performance for identical stimulus discriminations can be wildly
different dependent on presentation strategy. Thus, psychometric
performance must be compared with presenting pairs of stimuli
vs. a whole stimulus array, and algorithms to calculate optimal
neurometric sensitivity must be adjusted to reﬂect the animals’
optimal strategy, given these circumstances. For further studies of
neural coding in sensory system, we hold it vital to acknowledge
that clean estimates of “true” psychophysical sensitivity cannot
be obtained without appropriate models of perceptual decision-
making. Such models need not only isolate sensitivity from
response bias (Tanner and Swets, 1954; McCarthy and Davison,
1981; Busse et al., 2011) but from other factors affecting observed
performance as well, be they inherent to the psychophysical task
or not.
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